




Smallholder Farmers and Collective Action: What 
Determines the Intensity of Participation? 
 
Elisabeth Fischer and Matin Qaim 
Georg-August-University of Göttingen 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development 











Paper prepared for presentation at the EAAE 2011 Congress 
Change and Uncertainty 
Challenges for Agriculture, 
Food and Natural Resources 
 
August 30 to September 2, 2011 







Copyright 2011 by Elisabeth Fischer and Matin Qaim.  All rights reserved.  Readers may 
make  verbatim  copies  of  this  document  for  non-commercial  purposes  by  any  means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 1 
 
Acknowledgement.  The  financial  support  of  the  German  Research  Foundation  (DFG)  is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Smallholder Farmers and Collective Action: What 
Determines the Intensity of Participation? 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Smallholder  organization  in  farmer  groups  is  seen  as  an  institutional  solution  to 
overcoming market failures and high transaction costs associated with market exchange 
in  developing  countries  (Markelova  et  al.  2010).  In  addition,  farmer  organizations 
provide important platforms for capacity building, information and innovation in rural 
and  agricultural settings  (Bingen 2003).  Recently,  the promotion  of  farmer collective 
action has gained popularity in the context of the agri-food system transformation, as a 
response  to  stringent  quality  and  food  safety  standards,  contractual  relationships  and 
procurement systems (Narrod et al. 2009). For example, group contract arrangements can 
improve smallholder market power and ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits of 
contractual relationships (Key & Runsten 1999). Moreover, the presence of social capital 
may  also  reduce  the  likelihood  of  opportunistic  behavior,  such  as  extra-contractual 
marketing (Fafchamps 2004). There is, however, a need to better understand under what 
conditions and in what form collective action is useful and viable (Hellin et al. 2008, 
Markelova et al. 2010).  
There are a number of factors determining the success of collective action. Apart from 
the external environment and specific types of products and markets, the group-specific 
institutional  arrangements  and  characteristics  play  important  roles  (Markelova  et  al. 
2010). For example, smaller groups achieve higher levels of internal cohesion, because it 
is easier to know and monitor other members. Larger groups, however, exploit higher 
economies  of  scale  to  reduce  transaction  costs,  which  is  particularly  important  for 
marketing (Stringfellow et al. 1997). Another trade-off exists between inclusiveness and 
tight membership rules, which may increase the group’s effectiveness but exclude the 
poorest from participation. Collective action depends also on the external and internal 
capacities  in  human,  social  and  financial  capital  (Bingen  2003).  Very  little  attention 
though has been given to how these group characteristics and other factors shape the 
commitment and contributions that individuals make towards achieving a shared goal.  
Since  costs  and  benefits  of  engaging  in  collective  action  may  be  perceived  very 
differently by farmers, varying levels of participation are observed. In addition, without 
adequate mechanisms to punish defect behavior, farmers have an incentive to free-ride. 
The group makes a costly investment into farmers by providing services and inputs and it 
depends on its members to recompense these efforts by selling their products through the 
group so part of the revenues flow back to the group. When members do not honor this 
reciprocal  contract,  the  success  and  viability  of  collective  action  may  be  seriously 
threatened. Moreover, smallholder market access is facilitated through the exploitation of 
economies of scale, the size of which depends on the magnitude of member participation. 
This makes the identification of determinants of commitment and participation intensity 2 
 
central in the analysis of farmer collective action. This is of high relevance to smallholder 
collective action in developing countries. For example, Shiferaw et al. (2009) identified 
low volumes as one of the major limiting factors for the success of small-scale farmer 
marketing groups in Kenya. 
This article analyses the determinants of commitment to collective action using the case 
of  cooperatively  organized  small-scale  banana  producers  in  Kenya.  The  intensity  of 
participation in group meetings and collective marketing as well as side-selling are used 
as proxies to measure the degree of individual commitment. We contribute to the research 
direction  in  several  ways.  We  distinguish  between  different  intensities  of  group 
participation  in  our  analysis  to  provide  a  more  nuanced  picture  of  commitment  to 
collective action. This helps to understand the complexity of collective action beyond the 
decision  to  participate  or  not.  A  number  of  empirical  studies  investigated  why  some 
farmers engage in collective and others do not (e.g.; Ferrara 2003, Shiferaw et al. 2009; 
Wollni & Zeller 2008). However, no distinction is made between group membership, 
participation, and the intensity of participation. Moreover, the analysis of determinants of 
participation intensities provides explanations why some members exhibit higher degrees 
of  commitment  to  group  activities  than  others.  Highlighting  constraints  that  prevent 
higher  degrees  of  participation  allows  discussing  possible  measures  for  increasing 
participation  and  commitment,  so  that  the  potential  of  farmer  groups  can  be  fully 
realized.  
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly introduce the concept of 
commitment to collective action from a theoretical perspective. In the same section we 
also  provide  background  information  on  cooperatively  organized  banana  farmers  in 
central Kenya. In section 3, we describe the survey data and give descriptive statistics. 
The  estimation  results  are  presented  and  discussed  in  section  4  and  5.  Section  6 
concludes.  
2  BACKGROUND 
(a) Commitment to collective action  
Collective action is defined as voluntary action taken by a group of individuals, which 
invest  time  and  energy  to  pursue  shared  objectives  (Markelova  2010).  It  plays  an 
important role in the context of family farms and agricultural production. For example, 
cooperative  organization  has  helped  to  maintain  the  dominance  of  family  farms  in 
developed  countries  by  offsetting  some  of  their  disadvantages  related  to  size  and 
bargaining power (Valentinov 2007). In developing countries the disadvantages of family 
farms are further exacerbated by various forms of market failure, which are particularly 
severe  in  areas  with  poor  infrastructure  and  communication  networks.  As  a  result, 
smallholders  face  high  transaction  costs  of  market  exchange  that  significantly  reduce 
their  incentives  for  market  participation  (Wiggins  et  al.  2010,  Reardon  et  al.  2009). 
Through  achieving  economies  of  scale,  farmer  groups  can  countervail  some  of  these 
disadvantages,  particularly  those  concerning  high  external  transaction  costs  and 
asymmetric market power. 3 
 
Commitment is defined as acting towards fulfilling mutual, self-imposed or explicitly 
stated obligations. It has received much attention in the social sciences, particular in the 
fields of organizational behavior and rational choice (Robertson 1995). Organizational 
behavior focuses on the factors influencing the quality of an individual’s involvement and 
performance in  organizations;  for example attitudes, identification  with the  group,  its 
objectives and values, as well as loyalty and affection. Rational choice theory focuses on 
how an individual’s choice is dependent on comparing expected benefits and costs of 
different  alternatives.  Proponents  of  rational  choice  theory  argue  that  the  success  of 
collective action depends on the ability of individuals to make credible commitments. 
Rational, self-interested individuals will act to achieve their personal rather than group 
interests, and have an incentive to free-ride if they are given the opportunity to do so 
(Olson 1977). Therefore, forms of collective action have to implement mechanisms that 
punish  opportunistic  behavior,  such  as  extra-contractual  marketing;  otherwise  it  will 
cease to exist if enough members are disloyal (Fulton & Adamowicz 1993). However, 
rational choice theory also acknowledges the presence of informal social mechanisms, 
such  as  norms,  shared  values,  conventions,  which  make  individuals  not  renege  on  a 
promise. Underlying both strands of literature is the notion that individuals with higher 
levels  of  commitment  to  collective  action  are  more  likely  to  contribute  towards  the 
achievement of shared goals.  
(b)  Collective action in the Kenyan banana sector 
Recent developments in the Kenyan banana market provide an interesting example to 
analyze patterns of commitment to collective action. Banana and plantains provide an 
important source of food and income for millions of smallholders in East Africa and other 
developing  countries  (Arias  et  al.  2003).  Over  the  past  decades  there  has  been  a 
significant decrease in banana yields due to pests and diseases, which put a serious threat 
to household food and income security. Farmers have thus neglected banana production. 
The  trend  of  declining  yields  has  been  reversed  recently,  partly  due  to  the  use  of 
improved  planting  material  and  good  agronomic  practices,  which  was  supported  by 
government and non-government initiatives. At the same time, due to urbanization, a 
growing  middle  class  and  the  expansion  of  supermarkets,  demand  for  high-quality 
bananas is growing in Kenya. 
Recognizing both the problem of persistent low  yields on the one side and the large 
potential arising from growing demand for bananas on the other, a banana initiative was 
launched by Africa Harvest and TechnoServe – two international NGOs. Their goal was 
to raise rural household incomes and food supply by improving banana production and 
marketing through a joint approach covering the whole value chain. The basis of their 
initiative  was  the  formation  of  small  farmer  groups  dedicated  to  the  production  and 
marketing of fresh dessert banana. Groups were formed mostly by building on existing 
local networks and along social ties.  Members agreed on a group constitution and voted 
on group leadership, consisting of up to five to seven leaders. Groups became legally 
registered,  which  was  made  a  pre-condition  for  further  NGO  support.  A  range  of 
extension and training services was provided by NGO field agents, covering issues of 
production,  business  skill  and  marketing.  With  improved  access  to  innovation, 
information and markets, these efforts have facilitated a paradigm shift among banana 
farmers in central Kenya: banana is increasingly seen as a major cash crop. Over the past 4 
 
decade smallholder producers have become more reliant on the cash income generated 
from banana sales. This has occurred especially in areas where farmers saw their incomes 
from coffee and other traditional cash crops decline (Wambugu and Kiome 2001).  
Groups carry out a range of different activities: they hold regular meetings, carry out 
trainings and organize market days, where members sell their banana harvest collectively 
at  designated  collection  centers.  Participation  in  group  activities  is  voluntary,  though 
attendance and sales are often documented. Group meetings are held regularly; in most 
cases once per month. In the initial stages of group formation, member farmers were 
trained in group organization, leadership and group dynamics in order to build a solid and 
viable foundation of social capital for future activities. They were introduced to improved 
tissue culture (TC) planting material. Traditionally, bananas in Kenya are propagated by 
suckers  from  old  plantations,  a  procedure  through  which  pathogens  are  spread.  TC 
banana plantlets are propagated in a lab, so that plantlets are free of diseases and pests. 
Moreover,  farmers  receive  training  on  good  agronomic  practices,  such  as  orchard 
establishment  and  management,  disease  and  pest-identification,  post-harvest  handling, 
record keeping, marketing and negotiating skills.  
Banana market participation decisions are highly influenced by fixed transaction costs 
related to transportation and market information, which calls for farmer collective action 
in the banana sector (Ouma et al. 2010). In Kenya, bananas are traditionally marketed 
individually; the majority sells to mobile traders at the farm gate. Hence, groups also 
organize  collective  marketing.  Bananas  are  delivered  to  designated  collection  centers 
were  they  are  weighed,  graded,  bulked  and  sold.  Banana  sales  and  payments  are 
documented. While farmers have to pay a small fee for group membership, they keep 
individual accounts; that is, sales revenues are distributed according to actual delivery. 
Members also pay a small fee for collective marketing: one shilling per kg is deducted by 
the group. Prices that members receive through the group exceed prices paid at the farm 
gate by 16%. However, additional transportation costs lower the net benefit of collective 
marketing.  In  addition,  group  payment  is  often  delayed.  Despite  some  of  the 
disadvantages,  members  selling  through the  group  were  able  to  significantly  increase 
their total household incomes through increased banana production, whereas those who 
continued selling at the farm gate did not. This suggests that those who benefit most in 
terms of access to innovation and training, are also more committed when it comes to 
marketing.  
3  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
(a)  Household survey 
The data used in this study were collected in June and July 2009 in the central highlands 
of Kenya. Using a carefully designed and tested questionnaire, we conducted structured, 
household-level  interviews  with  banana  growers  in  the  districts  of  Muranga,  Nyeri, 
Embu, and Meru. These districts are located within the same agro-ecological zone, have 
similar access to road infrastructure, and are classified as high-potential banana-growing 
areas. We randomly sampled banana growers who are members of farmer groups as well 
as non-members for comparison of outcomes. 5 
 
In  order  to  select  members,  we  first  obtained  a  complete  list  of  240  banana  farmer 
groups; out of these, 17 groups were randomly selected, which were located in different 
sub-locations. Within each group, around 12 members were randomly selected, resulting 
in a total of 201 group member observations. Three groups in the sample have not (yet) 
started  collective  marketing.  As  agro-ecological  and  socio-economic  conditions  vary 
across  different  banana-growing  areas  of  Kenya  (Qaim  1999),  our  sample  is  not 
representative for the country as a whole. However, the majority of members were found 
to be highly comparable to the majority of randomly selected non-members based on 
farm and household characteristics. Sample descriptive statistics for group members are 
provided further below.  
(b) Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports sample mean values of dependent and independent variables for all group 
members. Participation in group meetings is relatively high: 90% of group members have 
at least participated once in a group meeting. Group meetings were held 12 times during a 
year, and on average members participated in 7.6 of those meetings. Members sell 2.88 
tons on average per year through the group. The standard deviation is relatively large at 
6.60, which suggests that there are large differences in individual sales across members. 
Only 60% of members market their bananas through the group, while others sell their 
banana  harvest  to  traders  at  the  farm-gate  or  through  alternative  market  outlets.  On 
average, members selling through the group sell about 52% of their total banana sales 
through the group, while they sell the rest elsewhere. 
Because  it  entails  the  uptake  of  new  agricultural  management  practices,  quality 
requirements  and  adoption  of  improved  planting  material,  group  participation  can  be 
treated similarly to technology adoption. To identify explanatory variables, we draw on 
the existing literature on program participation and technology adoption. The factors can 
be broadly categorized into farm, household and group characteristics, reflecting human, 
social  and  financial  capital  endowments  that  determine  the  willingness  and  ability  of 
farmers to invest in and benefit from collective action. Variable values refer to a period of 
12 months before May/June 2009. A few dependent variables require further explanation. 
We used a subjective measure to assess exploitation by traders. Based on a four-point 
likert scale farmers were asked how severely they felt exploited by traders. One of the 
major advantages of group marketing is collective bargaining, so we expect members 
who feel exploited to exhibit higher participation, particularly in group marketing. We 
also included a variable measuring group size in terms of number of members: while 
small groups achieve higher internal cohesion, large groups realize higher economies of 
scale,  which  may  influence  the  incentives  to  participate.  The  timing  of  payments  is 
expected to negatively influence the decision to participate in group marketing. Members 
are mostly asset-poor, small-scale farmers, and thus likely to have a high preference for 
immediate  cash  when  selling their  harvest.  However,  with  group  marketing,  delay  in 
payments in possible, which might drive poorer farmers away from group marketing. 
Finally, group dummies were included to account for group fixed effects, such as the 
quality of leadership. 6 
 
4  DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN GROUP MEETINGS 
We first estimate a multinomial logit model of participation in group meetings. Group 
members were classified into three categories  according to the  number of times they 
participated in group meetings. Infrequent participants either attend once, twice or never. 
Frequent participants participate more often, up to nine times per year, but are not able or 
have no intention to attend regularly. Finally, there are members who attend regularly, ten 
times or more often. Estimation results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. 
The  coefficients  are  can  be  viewed  as  parameters  of  a  binary  logit  model  between 
frequent or regular participation to infrequent participation. The base category are the 
infrequent participants. 
Column (1) compares frequent to infrequent participants. We find that the size of the 
banana orchard, yield, TC adoption and participation in other social groups are positively 
influence the decision to participate frequently. The effect of orchard size is curvilinear, 
which implies that bigger banana producers are less likely to participate frequently: the 
log-odds  of  participating  frequently  increase  up  to  1  acre  and  decreases  thereafter. 
Having an irrigation system on the farm decreases the likelihood of participation; most 
likely  because  with  the  availability  of  irrigation  water  they  have  fewer  problems  of 
production, and thus a lower need for group services. Similar results can be observed in 
column (2), which compares regular to infrequent participants, although the effects of 
irrigation and social participation are not significant. In addition, the distance to the group 
meeting center also plays a role at higher participation frequencies: those who live further 
away are less likely to be regular participants. A significant gender bias against female 
members  can  be  observed,  since  female  members  are  less  likely  to  be  regular 
participants. Despite the fact that banana is traditionally a women’s crop, women have 
numerous responsibilities as farmers and family caretakers, and thus may be less likely to 
attend meetings regularly.  
5 DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION IN GROUP MARKETING  
We now estimate models of the quantity and the share of bananas sold through the group 
to  identify  the  determinants  of  group  marketing  decisions.  The  dependent  variables 
(quantity  and  share)  are  zero  with  a  positive  probability  but  strictly  continuous  over 
positive values. Tobit and double-hurdle models are appropriate to estimate such corner-
solution responses. For the analysis the sample is confined to groups that regularly have 
market days at designated collection centers. A likelihood ratio test indicates preference 
of  the  double-hurdle  over  the  tobit  specification.  The  hurdle  model  implies  that  the 
decision to sell through the group and the decision of how much to sell are two separate 
decisions, made in a sequential manner. A heckman-selection model is estimated to test 
for possible selection bias, but the coefficient of the Inverse Mills Ratio is not significant 
at the 10% level. Hence, we accept the hypothesis of independence of the errors terms of 
the participation equation and the quantity and share equations and continue with the 
independent hurdle model. 
Column (3), (4) and (5) in Table 2 report the estimation results of the hurdle model 
estimation for the decision to sell through the group, how much to sell through the group, 
and  which  share of  total  sales  to sell through  the  group,  respectively.  Regarding the 7 
 
decision  to  sell  through  the  group,  size  of  the  banana  orchard  has  a  positive  and 
significant effect; again following a curvilinear pattern. Hence, members with relatively 
small plantations and members with relatively large plantations are less likely to opt for 
group marketing. The former may not be able to provide enough quantity and quality to 
sell  through  the  group,  while  the latter  may  have  alternative,  more  profitable market 
outlets and, due to their plantation size, do not incur high external transaction costs when 
marketing individually. These results suggests that medium-sized banana growers benefit 
most from collective action and are thus more likely to be marketing through the group.  
Banana  yield  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  the  probability  to  sell  bananas 
through the group. More productive farmers can be expected to produce under higher 
input regimes, and thus produce larger quantities and larger bunches, which are preferred 
by traders. The production of other cash crops, such as coffee and tea, has a positive 
impact on the decision for group marketing. Farmers who are engaged in farming for the 
purpose  of  income-generation  beyond  subsistence  production  are  more  likely  take 
advantage of the marketing opportunities provided by the group. Surprisingly, female 
members are equally likely to participate in group marketing as male members. 
The degree of subjectively felt exploitation by intermediary traders has a positive and 
significant effect on group marketing: the less farmers feel subject to exploitation the 
more likely they are to opt for group marketing. Distance to the collection center has a 
negative but not significant effect on the decision for group marketing. This might be 
explained by the local availability of cheap public transport. As expected, the timing of 
group payments negatively influences the decision to market through the group.  
After members decided to market bananas through the group, they decide on how much 
to sell. The determinants of this decision are shown in column (4). We find that banana 
yield and size of the banana orchard have positive effects on the decision of how much to 
sell.  Higher  levels  of  education  also  positively  influence  the  quantity  of  sales.  The 
production of other cash crops decreases group sales; a possible explanation being that 
farmers  producing  other  cash  crops  do  not  prioritize  on  selling  banana.  Members 
participating in other social groups are expected to sell more through the group. They are 
likely to have a higher general trust in collective action, because of their positive past 
experiences and successes, and higher familiarity with group dynamics. Group size has a 
negative effect on the quantity of sales, which might be explained by greater difficulties 
in monitoring, which may increase incentives for side-selling, and less close social ties. 
Column (5) shows estimation results of the second stage of the double-hurdle model for 
share  of  total  sales  made  through  the  group,  and  thus  also  includes  only  those  who 
decided  to  sell  through  the  group.  Age,  the  level  of  education  and  household  size 
positively influence  the  share  of  total  sales  made  through  the  group.  Group  size  and 
delayed  payment  both  seem  to  decrease  the  share.  Hence,  disadvantageous  group 
characteristics exacerbate the problem of side-selling. These results imply that the extent 
side-selling  depends  primarily  on  personal  characteristics  that  are  likely  to  influence 
attitudes  towards  collective  action,  and  group-specific  factors,  such  as  institutional 
arrangements that generate incentives for free-riding. 8 
 
6  CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Collective action in farmer groups is an important strategy for smallholders to remain 
competitive in rapidly changing environments. The major objective of this article was to 
expand the commonly used concept of farmer group participation, mostly measured as a 
binary choice variable, by distinguishing between different intensities of participation. 
Since individual commitment and contributions in terms of time and energy are crucial 
for  the  success  and  viability  of  collective  action,  we  sought  to  identify  what  causes 
differences in participation intensities across group members. Survey data from central 
Kenya was used to analyze how human, social and asset capital endowments as well as 
group characteristics determine participation intensities in collective action among small-
scale banana farmers.  The frequency of participation in group meetings, the quantity of 
individual group sales, and the extent of side-selling were used as proxies to measure 
individual commitment to cooperative organization. The groups considered were recently 
formed with the support of NGOs, in order to improve farmers’ access to new banana 
(TC) technology, related extension, and high-value output markets.  
Multinomial logit and double-hurdle regression were applied to model participation in 
group  meetings  and  collective  marketing.  The  results  showed  that  the  extent  of 
specialization on banana production, related productivity and technology adoption are 
positively associated with the intensity of participation in group activities. Distance to the 
collection center negatively affects the intensity of participation at higher levels. Also, 
members  who  participate  in  other  social  groups  are  more  likely  to  exhibit  higher 
involvement in group activities, which may reflect their general trust in collective action 
and  stronger  social  ties.  Group  size  reduces  the  frequency  of  participation,  which 
suggests that close social ties are important for participation in collective action. 
We  further  find  that,  while  women  are  less  likely  to  attend  meetings  at  a  regular 
frequency, they are equally likely to sell through the group and also sell as much as men. 
Delayed payment of group marketing has a negative effect on the decision to sell through 
the group. Payment can take up to three to five days in some cases. The majority of group 
members  are  asset-poor,  small-scale  farmers,  and  it  is  likely  that  they  face  liquidity 
constraints, which makes direct cash paid at the farm-gate the more attractive option. We 
also find that members with lower degrees of perceived exploitation by traders are also 
more likely to participate in group marketing. This result may reflect a general trust in 
traders  that  extends  to  group  trading  partners  as  well.  Low  commitment  to  group 
marketing, measured in the extent of side-selling, seems to be primarily influenced by 
personal  characteristics,  such  as  age  and  education,  which  shape  attitudes  as  well  as 
group characteristics and institutional arrangements. Farm size and productivity do not 
emerge to play a role for commitment. 
The analysis presented in this article fills an important research gap on the determinants 
of varying commitment to collective action among smallholder farmers in developing 
countries.  In  the  literature  on  cooperative  organization  in  agricultural  sectors  of 
developed countries, success and survival of collective action of has found to be often 
threatened  by  opportunistic  behavior  of  group  members,  such  as  extra-contractual 
marketing. Cooperative organizations in developing countries face additional threats if 
their members are constrained of higher levels of participation. In the case of banana 
farmer  groups  in  Kenya,  specialization  on  banana  production,  productivity  and 9 
 
technology  adoption  emerged  to  be  highly  important  determinants  of  commitment  to 
group marketing and other activities. Hence, for the farmer it is not necessarily a decision 
to participate in group activities or not, but a decision or ability to expand and intensify 
banana  production  and  make  necessary  banana-specific  investments,  which  make 
involvement in product-specific farmer groups worthwhile.  
However, although a trend for greater crop specialization among small-scale farmers in 
Kenya  and  other  Sub-Saharan  countries  can  be  observed,  they  are  still  often  highly 
diversified, as they generate farm income from a variety of agricultural activities, such as 
various  cereal  crops,  vegetables,  fruits,  dairy  and  other  crops  (Kimenju  &  Tschirley 
2008). They are also often engaged in number of non-agricultural activities outside the 
farm as well. Considering time constraints, particularly of women, farmers who generate 
a relatively small proportion of their total income from one particular crop may not find 
that the efforts of participating in a group that promotes this crop outweigh the benefits. 
These  considerations  derive  an  important  policy  recommendation.  Under  certain 
conditions it may be reasonable for small-scale farmer groups to not focus only on the 
promotion of a single crop, but instead diversify their portfolio of services to include a 
range of other agricultural products as well.  Group formation is often initiated externally 
by government and NGO agents to promote the dissemination of particular crop-specific 
technologies. In the case of banana groups in Kenya this had led to forms of collective 
action  that  focus  on  one  crop  only.  In  very  few  cases  banana  group  activities  were 
expanded to mango and rabbit meat production through the initiative of the members.   
Product diversification is a well known strategy in corporate marketing. Although being 
potentially  motivated  by  different  reasons,  product  diversification  of  cooperative 
organizations can similarly increase profitability, manage risk, and enhance access to new 
markets. It would further economize on transaction costs and increase benefits for small-
scale, highly diversified farmers. However, for successful product diversification external 
support  is  needed  to  build  up  human  skills  and  provide  necessary  technologies  and 
extension. 
REFERENCES 
Arias, P., Dankers, C., Liu, P., & Pilkauskas, P. (2003). The World Banana Economy, 1985-2002. 
Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
Bingen, J., Serrano, A. and Howard, J. (2003). Linking farmers to markets: different approaches 
to human capital development. Food Policy, 28( 4), 405-419. 
Ferrara, E. (2002). Inequality and group participation: theory and evidence from rural Tanzania. 
Journal of Public Economics, 85, 235-273. 
Fulton, J. R. & Adamowicz, W.L. (1993). Factors that influence the commitment of members to 
their cooperative organization. Journal of Cooperatives, 8. 
Hellin,  J.,  Lundy,  M.;  Meijer,  M.  (2008).  Farmer  organization,  collective  action  and  market 
access in Meso-America. Food Policy, 34(1), 16-22. 
Kimenju, S., Tschirley, D. (2008). Agriculture and livelihood diversification in Kenyan rural 
households.  Working  Paper  Series,  29,  Tegemeo  Institut  of  Agricultural  Policy  and 
Development. 10 
 
Markelova,  H.,  Meinzen-Dick,  R.,  Hellin,  J.,  &  Dohrn,  S.  (2009).  Collective  action  for 
smallholder market access. Food Policy, 34(1), 1–7.  
Narrod, C., Roy, D., Okello, J., Avendaño, B., Rich, K., & Thorat, A. (2009). Public-private 
partnerships and collective action in high value fruit and vegetable supply chains. Food 
Policy, 34(1), 8–15.  
Olson,  M.  (1977).  The  logic  of  collective  action:  public  goods  and  the  theory  of  groups. 
Cambridge, London. 
Qaim, M. (1999). Assessing the impact of banana biotechnology in Kenya. ISAAA Briefs, 10. 
Ithaca, NY: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. 
Reardon,  T.,  Barrett,  C.B.,  Berdegué,  J.A.,  &  Swinnen,  J.F.M.  (2009).  Agrifood  industry 
transformation and small farmers in developing countries. World Development, 37(11), 
1717–1727.  
Robertson,  P., Tang,  S. (1995). The  role  of commitment in  collective  action:  comparing  the 
organizational behavior and rational choice perspectives. Public Administration Review, 
55(1), 67-90 
Shiferaw, B., Obare, G., Muricho, G., Silim, S. (2009). Leveraging institutions for collective 
action  to  improve  markets  for  smallholder  producers  in  less-favored  areas.  African 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 3(1), 1-18. 
Stringfellow, R., Coulter, J., Lucey, T., McKone, C., & Hussain, A. (1997). Improving the access 
of smallholders to agricultural services in sub-Saharan Africa: Farmer cooperation and 
the role of the donor community. Natural Resource Perspectives, 20. London: Overseas 
Development Institute. 
Valentinov,  V.  (2007).  Why  are  cooperatives  important  in  agriculture?  An  organizational 
economics perspective. Journal of Institutional Economics, 3(01), 55–69.  
Wiggins, S., Kirsten, J., LLambi (2010). The future of small farms. World Development, 38(10), 
1341-1348. 
Wollni, M., & M. Zeller. (2007). Do farmers benefit from participating in specialty markets and 
cooperatives? The case of coffee marketing in Costa Rica. Agricultural Economics, 37(2-
3), 243–248. 
Key, N. & Runsten, D. (1999). Contract farming, smallholders and rural development in Latin 
America: the organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower production. 
World Development, 27(2), 381-401. 
Fafchamps,  M. (2004). Market  institutions  in  sub-Saharan  Africa:  theory  and  evidence. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Wambugu, F., & Kiome, R.M. (2001). The beneﬁts of biotechnology for small-scale banana 
producers  in  Kenya.  ISAAA  Briefs  22.  Ithaca,  NY:  International  Service  for  the 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. 
Ouma,  E.,  Jagwe,  J.,  Obare,  G.A.,  Abele,  S.  (2010).  Determinants  of  smallholder  farmers‘ 
participation  in  banana  markets  in  central  Africa:  the  role  of  transaction  costs. 
Agricultural Economics, 41(2), 111-122. 
   11 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics  
Variable  Description  Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Dependent variables 
Meetings  No. of group meetings participated in the last 12 months  201  7.60  7.14  0  52 
D_meetings  Member participates in group meetings (1=yes, 0=no)  201  0.90  0.30  0  1 
Sales  Sales in tons of banana made through the group past 12 months  172  2.88  6.60  0  51 
D_sales  Member is selling through the group (1=yes, 0=no)  172  0.60  0.49  0  1 
Share  Share of sold bananas sold through the group from total sales  172  0.52  0.43  0  1 
Independent variables 
Land holdings  Total land owned by household in acres  201  3.22  2.99  0.13  20 
Motorized  Household owns car, pick-up, or motorbike (yes=1, no=0)  201  0.19  0.40  0  1 
Phone  Household owns mobile phone (yes=1, no=0)  201  0.92  0.28  0  1 
Irrigation  Household uses irrigation (yes=1, no=0)  201  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Banana area  Banana plot size in acres  201  0.44  0.46  0.03  3.71 
Yield  Banana output in t/acre  201  11.30  9.52  0  42.42 
TC   Household has TC banana  201  0.75  0.44  0  1 
Cashcrop  Household produces cash crops (e.g., coffee, tea, cotton, etc.)  201  0.61  0.49  0  1 
Female   Group member is female  201  0.45  0.50  0  1 
Education  Education of member in years of schooling  201  9.06  4.45  0  18 
Age  Age of member in years  201  53.84  14.24  21  88 
Non-farm activity  Member pursues non-farm activity (yes=1, no=0)  201  0.21  0.41  0  1 
Household size  No. of household members  201  4.70  2.09  1  15 
Social participation  Household participates in other groups (yes=1, no=0)  201  0.85  0.36  0  1 
Perceived exploitation  Group member feels exploited by intermediaries (severely=1 to not at all=4)  200  2.10  1.14  1  4 
Distance  Distance to group meeting place or collection center  201  1.83  1.60  0.01  10 
Group size  No. of members in the group  172  53.13  21.46  25  103 
Payment  Member receives delayed payment (yes=1, no=0)  172  0.43  0.49  0  1 
Source: own survey data 
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Table 2: Determinants of participation in group meetings, collective marketing and side-selling 
Participation in meetings  
(Multinomial regression model)     
Collective marketing decisions 
(Double-Hurdle regression) 
(1)  
Frequent vs. infrequent 
participants 
(2)  
Regular vs. infrequent 
participants 
(3) 
Decision to sell  
through the group 
(4) 
Decision how much to  
sell through the group
b 
(5)  
Decision what share 
to sell through the 
group
b 
   Coefficient  S.E.
a  Coefficient  S.E.
a  Coefficient  S.E.
a  Coefficient  S.E.
a  Coefficient  S.E.
a 
Land holdings  -0.015  (0.148)  -0.045  (0.134)  0.007  (0.059)  0.031  (0.370)  -0.003  (0.011) 
Motorized  -0.560  (0.722)  -0.242  (0.655)  0.688  *  (0.393)  -0.035  (1.213)  -0.072  (0.058) 
Irrigation  -1.378  **  (0.706)  -0.572  (0.642)  0.768  (0.624)  2.426  (3.397)  0.057  (0.066) 
Banana area  4.894  ***  (1.588)  3.490  **  (1.499)  1.367  **  (0.657) 
c20.118  ***  (2.836)  0.077  (0.102) 
Banana area2  -2.376  ***  (0.721)  -1.587  **  (0.649)  -0.406  **  (0.183)    excluded  -0.012  (0.030) 
Yield  0.081  ***  (0.040)  0.068  *  (0.036)  0.033  *  (0.018) 
c20.113  ***  (4.371)  -0.004  (0.003) 
TC   1.916  ***  (0.678)  2.292  ***  (0.843)  0.410  (0.486)  -1.556  (3.618)  0.018  (0.058) 
Cashcrop  -0.381  (0.606)  0.810  (0.641)  0.715  **  (0.310)  -5.270  **  (2.376)  -0.031  (0.066) 
Female   -1.087  (0.819)  -1.138  *  (0.605)  0.304  (0.266)  0.114  (1.732)  -0.076  (0.082) 
Education  -0.067  (0.088)  -0.022  (0.067)  -0.077  *  (0.042)  0.242  (0.175)  0.013  *  (0.007) 
Age  0.000  (0.023)  -0.012  (0.024)  0.007  (0.012)  -0.012  (0.080)  0.003  *  (0.002) 
Non-farm activity  1.045  (0.799)  0.316  (0.815)  0.435  (0.418)  0.105  (4.178)  -0.034  (0.099) 
Household size  0.023  (0.131)  -0.075  (0.146)  -0.041  (0.096)  -0.149  (0.539)  0.034  ***  (0.010) 
Social participation  2.408  **  (0.974)  1.153  (0.788)  0.191  (0.448)  12.140  ***  (4.539)  0.095  (0.113) 
Exploit  0.019  (0.300)  0.216  (0.226)  0.373  ***  (0.099)  -1.987  (1.499)  0.041  (0.025) 
Distance  -0.119  (0.556)  -1.130  ***  (0.405)  -0.248  (0.209)  0.985  (2.827)  -0.001  (0.057) 
Distance2  -0.024  (0.082)  0.119  ***  (0.041)  0.012  (0.029)  -0.107  (0.446)  0.000  (0.010) 
Group size  -2.195  ***  (0.197)  -2.221  ***  (0.200)  -0.064  ***  (0.020)  -0.294  **  (0.125)  -0.004  ***  (0.001) 
Payment  -3.467  ***  (0.554)  0.225  (5.648)  -0.187  ***  (0.045) 
Constant  93.536  ***  (8.962)  96.368  ***  (9.206)  2.170  (1,659)  -26.9484  **  (14.252)  0.796  ***  (0.263) 
Group dummies  included  included  included  included  included 
Sigma  4.739  ***  (0.479)  0.239  ***  (0.015) 
Observations  200  171  120  120 
LR chi2(34)  117.5  68.54  135.8  62.3 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
(Pseudo) R2  0.271  0.344 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively;  Source: own survey data 
a Cluster robust standard errors,
 b Conditional on positive banana sales through the group 
c Coefficient of log(depvar) 
 